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Some Perspectives on the Actuarial Adequacy of  the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
Andrew Frank Thompson
Abstract
This paper analyzes the actuarial adequacy of  PBGC in providing insurance coverage to 
employees participating in single employer, defined benefit  pension plans. The first part of  
this investigation examines the micro and macro economic factors that impact the financial 
stability and actuarial viability of  PBGC. A second section discusses externalities that may 
contribute to suboptimal premiums and adverse selection for PBGC. A linear control model is 
introduced to analyze the most effective way PBGC might use its $100 million credit line with 
the Department of  the Treasury. In addition, a model based on the economic theory of  clubs 
develops relationships between the size of  a pension, its level of  benefits and the motivations of  
employers to fully fund a plan or lay it off  to PBGC. Within this framework, this investigation 
examines how changes in the actuarial discount rate or the actuarial cost method for valuing 
postretirement obligations may significantly alter PBGC’s future claim experience and reserve 
adequacy. The paper concludes with a discussion of  possible funding solutions to address 
potential inadequacies in PBGC reserves against bankrupt plans in the industrial manufacturing 
sector of  the U.S. economy.
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Some Perspectives on the Actuarial Adequacy of  the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
Andrew Frank Thompson
Introduction: Micro and Macro Financial and Economic Factors Impacting PBGC
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), created under the 1974 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, is a quasi-governmental insurer offering coverage to participants in defined benefit 
pension plans.  While PBGC is considered a federal agency under the U.S. Department of  Labor, its primary 
funding is based on income generated from premiums charged to employer sponsors of  defined benefit 
plans.  As a federal corporation, PBGC is governed by a Board of  Directors consisting of  the Secretaries 
of  Labor, Commerce and Treasury. Presently, PBGC provides insurance to 44.4 million workers and 
retirees in 31,200 private defined benefit plans.  The largest number of  workers and retirees, 34.6 million, 
are members of  single-employer plans. 1  Consequently, the focus of  this study will concentrate 
on single-employer plans involving individual U.S. companies offering defined benefit plans to 
workers.  During the 2004 fiscal year, PBGC received $1.485 billion in premium income plus 
$3.251 billion from investments against plan termination losses and actuarial adjustments of  
$16.495 billion.  Net losses on insurance to the single employer plans amounted to $12.067 
billion and the capital position ran a deficit of  $23.305 billion.  As noted in the Chairman’s 
letter to PBGC’s most recent 2004 Annual Report, “the Corporation does not have sufficient 
resources to meet all of  its long-term obligations.”2
Table 1 provides an historical perspective on the long-run financial position of  PBGC since 
1985.   Annual increases in the PBGC capital deficit from 1995 onward grew at a faster rate 
(53.42%) than during the entire 20 year period from 1985(15.28%).  In the period from 1985 
to 1995, PBGC experienced deficits of  between—$315 million and—$2.897 billion.  Following 
a brief  period from 1996 to 2001, when PBGC ran capital surpluses between $869 million and 
$9.704 billion, the agency faced growing deficits thereafter with the latest 2005 shortfall reported 
at $22.776 billion.  
       
1 U.S. Department of  Labor, 2004 Annual Report of  the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, p. 1.
2 U.S. Department of  Labor, op.cit., pp. 1-2.
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                            Table 1     
               Net Financial Position of  PBGC’s Single-Employer Program from  
                                                       1985 to 2005
 
    Fiscal                 Assets                     Liabilities              Net Financial Position
     Year               in Millions                in Millions                   In Millions
   2005                   $56,470                   $79,246                       -$22,776
   2004                   $38,993                   $62,298                       -$23,305
   2003                   $34,016                   $45,254                       -$11,238
   2002                   $25,430                   $29,068                        -$ 3,638
   2001                   $21,768                   $14,036                         $ 7,732
   2000                   $20,830                   $11,126                         $ 9,704
   1999                   $18431                    $11,393                         $ 7,038
   1998                   $17,631                   $12,619                         $ 5,012
   1997                   $15,314                   $11,833                         $ 3,481
   1996                   $12,043                   $11,174                         $    869
   1995                   $10,371                   $10,686                        -$    315
   1994                   $  8,281                   $  9,521                        -$ 1,240                 
   1993                   $  8,267                   $11,164                        -$ 2,897
   1992                   $  6,381                   $  9,118                        -$ 2,737
   1991                   $ 5,422                    $  7,925                        -$ 2,503
   1990                   $ 2,797                    $  4,710                        -$ 1,913
   1989                   $ 3,059                    $  4,183                        -$ 1,124
   1988                   $ 2,422                    $  3,965                        -$ 1,543                 
   1987                   $ 2,163                    $  3,712                        -$ 1,549
   1986                   $ 1,740                    $  3,766                        -$ 2,026
   1985                   $ 1,155                    $  2,480                        -$ 1,325
   
Annual 
Increase in the PBGC Deficit 1985-2005:                                                        15.28%
Annual % 
Increase in the PBGC Deficit 1995-2005:                                                         53.43%
__________________________________________________________________________________                       
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, “Single Employer Data 
Tables,” Table S-1, p. 26; 2005 PBGC Annual Report, “Financial Statement Highlights,” p. 2.
An actuarial and financial approach to adequately funding PBGC insurance coverage requires that 
the present value of  future premiums be sufficient to meet the present value of  future obligations 
to workers and retirees of  terminating, defined benefit pension plans.  Two critical variables in 
maintaining the viability of  an insurer is the ability to (1) adjust premiums to fully reflect the 
risks assumed with coverage and (2) alter underwriting and benefit structures to avoid adverse 
selection.  Initially, PBGC charged a flat premium rate per insured worker of  $2.60 to $8.50.  By 
1988, PBGC started charging a flat rate, plus a variable rate based on the level of  under funding 
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in vested plan benefits.   Rates in 1988 were $16 per worker with an excess variable premium of  
$6 per $1,000 of  unfunded benefit up to a maximum of  $34 per worker.   These rates gradually 
increased to $19 per insured worker and $9 per $1,000 of  unfunded benefit without a cap. Table 
2 examines the historic premium rates for PBGC coverage from 1985 to 2004.
 Table 2
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Historic Premium Rates and Revenues
       For 1985 through 2004
Flat Variable
Flat Premium % of  Total Variable Premium % of  Total Total 
Premium Revenue Premium Premium Revenue Premium Premium 
Year Rate [In Millions] Revenue Rate [In 
Millions]
Revenue Revenue
1985 $2.60 $81.7 100.00% 0.00% $81.7 
1986 $8.50 $201.4 100.00% 0.00% $201.4 
1987 $8.50 $267.6 100.00% 0.00% $267.6 
1988 $16.00 $414.4 89.23% $6/$1000 
 Unfunded:$34 Max
$50.0 10.77% $464.4 
1989 $16.00 $503.2 83.42% $6/$1000 
 Unfunded:$34 Max
$100.0 16.58% $603.2 
1990 $16.00 $509.0 77.24% $6/$1000 Unfunded:$34 
Max
$150.0 22.76% $659.0 
1991 $19.00 $541.0 73.01% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: $53 Max
$200.0 26.99% $741.0 
1992 $19.00 $590.0 67.43% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: $53 Max
$285.0 32.57% $875.0 
1993 $19.00 $605.0 67.98% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: $53 Max
$285.0 32.02% $890.0 
1994 $19.00 $648.0 67.85% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: $53 Max
$307.0 32.15% $955.0 
1995 $19.00 $587.0 70.05% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: $53 Max
$251.0 29.95% $838.0 
1996 $19.00 $600.0 52.36% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$546.0 47.64% $1,146.0 
1997 $19.00 $646.0 60.54% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$421.0 39.46% $1,067.0 
1998 $19.00 $642.0 66.46% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$324.0 33.54% $966.0 
1999 $19.00 $611.0 67.74% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$291.0 32.26% $902.0 
2000 $19.00 $661.0 81.91% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$146.0 18.09% $807.0 
2001 $19.00 $674.0 82.10% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded:No Max.
$147.0 17.90% $821.0 
2002 $19.00 $654.0 83.10% $9/$100 
0 Unfunded: No Max.
$133.0 16.90% $787.0 
2003 $19.00 $647.0 68.25% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$301.0 31.75% $948.0 
2004 $19.00 $654.0 44.86% $9/$1000 
 Unfunded: No Max.
$804.0 55.14% $1,458.0 
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Note: In general, variable rates are stated rate/$1000 unfunded vested benefit, with a maximum limit per 
participant.  However for 1994-95 there was an additional 20% uncapped premium in excess of  the $53. From 
1995 to 1996 the uncapped portion went up to 60%.  After 1996 there wasn’t a maximum limit on the variable 
premium.  
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, Table S-37 and S-38, pp. 
62-63.
Total premium revenue remained low during the period from 1985 to 1995 when the majority 
of  PBGC’s income was derived from flat rate fees for coverage. However, beginning in 1988 
variable premiums, as a percentage of  total premium revenue, increased with changes in the 
amount charged per $1,000 of  unfunded, vested benefits and the gradual elimination of  the 
maximum cap.  One of  the largest years for premium revenue was in 1996, the first year the cap 
was eliminated when the fund received $1.146 billion.  This coincided with the switch in PBGC’s 
net financial position from a negative to positive capital account [i.e., -315 million to +$869 
million].  In years 2003 and 2004, when PBGC’s capital deficit grew to $22.776 billion, variable 
premium revenues increased as a proportion of  total premium income to 55.14%, a record level 
of  contribution.  These results would appear to support two underwriting positions: (1) the flat 
premium may have to increase to allow for healthier pension plans to support insurance reserves 
and (2) variable rates need to be revised upward to fully reflect added risk on those plans with 
under funded benefits.   In recognition of  these underwriting considerations, the recently passed 
Deficit Reduction Act of  2005, increases PBGC’s flat and variable rate premiums as of  the 
beginning of  2006.  Under this act, flat premiums go up to $30 per insured worker retroactive 
to the beginning of  year with future premium increases pegged to the average annual increase 
in national wages. 3     
From a microeconomic, insurance perspective, PBGC offers a unique form of  coverage. 
Although the policy insures pension benefits for workers participating in defined benefit plans, 
the premiums are paid by firms sponsoring the pensions. The insured party is not the policyholder 
or premium payer for the coverage.  The insurance is owned by the corporation, on behalf  of  
the insured workers covered by PBGC.  Consequently, the managers of  the firm decide whether 
to continue their defined benefit plan and pay premiums, or terminate the pension.  Insured 
workers have little control over these decisions.    Plan terminations may occur as the result of  
bankruptcy or a firm’s managerial decision to convert the pension into a defined contribution 
plan.   The latter is considered to be a voluntary termination, as opposed to, the former being an 
involuntary termination.   PBGC’s insurance coverage provides guaranteed benefits to retirees 
who find themselves in involuntarily terminated plans. PBGC’s claim liability is based on the 
value of  the plan assets, the level of  benefits defined within the terminated plan, the limits of  
PBGC coverage, and the extent corporate assets may be subrogated to pay guaranteed benefits. 
The value of  the plan assets will depend on the funding, investment returns, and pension payouts 
that occurred before a firm’s bankruptcy.   In some instances, a plan might be fully funded even 
 
3 Business Insurance, “Congress OKs Hike in PBGC premiums,” February 6, 2006, Vol. 40, Issue 6, p. 1.  Also see: 
http://www.house.gov/pence/rsc/lgbullettins06.shtml
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when the firm files for bankruptcy.   However, in most cases the plan assets are considerably less 
than the actuarial value of  the plan’s future pension obligations.  Whenever this occurs, PBGC 
recalculates benefits to determine what its obligation is, based on the limits of  coverage and the 
value of  the transferred assets in the terminated plan. 4 The lesser of  those two amounts serves 
as the basis for future pension payments to the covered retiree.   When PBGC receives pension 
assets from a terminated plan, there can be a priority to a retirees claim to enhanced benefits. 
Those employees who have made voluntary contributions to the pension, retirees who have 
been receiving fixed benefits prior to PBGC taking over the plan, current employees with vested 
benefits less than the PBGC maximum benefit limits, employees with vested benefits above 
the PBGC maximum benefit limits, and participants with unvested benefits, all have varying 
priorities on assets taken in by PBGC after an involuntary termination, according to ERISA law. 
5 Although PBGC has a maximum benefit limit should pension assets be insufficient to cover all 
retiree benefits in a terminated plan, it is possible for these benefit amounts to be enhanced should 
PBGC be successful in attaching a claim to the corporate assets of  the bankrupt firm. However, 
difficulties with handling assets acquired from terminated plans are significant including, but not 
limited to: (1) the cost of  managing physical assets until a sale can be made (2) determining a fair 
value of  the assets quickly (3) maintaining the value of  the assets while an appraisal is being made 
of  whether to dispose or retain the property, and (4) dealing with litigation costs associated with 
enforcing PBGC’s right to the property.  
 
 A recent example of  the reduction in pension payments to PBGC retirees, from the diminishing 
value of  pension assets, is the United Airlines bankruptcy and pension termination.  PGBC 
became an unsecured creditor in United Airlines when the company shifted $10.2 billion in 
unfunded pension liabilities to the agency in December of  2002.   PBGC reached an agreement, 
during the United Airlines bankruptcy proceedings, to receive a $5.6 billion claim on the new 
United Airlines.  In February 2006, PBGC sold $2.5 billion of  this claim to hedge fund investors 
and banks for $450 million or $.18 on the dollar.    Under PBGC’s maximum benefit cap, 
some of  the 120,000 United workers will see large cuts in their retirement income due to the 
insufficiency of  the value of  the pension assets received from the United Airlines bankruptcy.6 
In past bankruptcies, PBGC has received such diverse assets as: “diamonds, a hog slaughtering 




4 Jay A. Jupiter, “The PBGC’s Rule on Determining Termination Liability, Journal of  Pension Planning and 
Compliance, (January 1982), Vol. 8, Issue 8, pp. 41-46.  Under PBGC rules, an employer is liable to the agency for 
any plan asset insufficiency up to 30% of  the employer’s net worth.  Net worth at the time of  termination may 
include reorganization value, liquidating value of  the employer’s tangible and intangible property, the value of  equity 
assumed in a plan of  reorganization, or any other factor relevant in determining net worth.  See Part 4062- Liability 
for termination of  single-employer plans, PBGC regulations, 29 U.S.C. 1302(b)(3) 1362-1364, 1367, 1368 found in: 
http://www.pbgc.gov/practitioners/law-regulations-informal-guidance/content/page14767.html 
5 Caroline K. Craig, and Thomas R. Craig, “The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation: What Financial Advisers 
Should Know,” Journal of  Financial Service Professionals, (March 2004), Volume 58, Issue 2, p. 74.  This article 
provides a good summary of  the financial planning factors that may impact the type of  retirement income PBGC 
insurance recipient may receive based on plan assets, time of  retirement, and type of  annuity benefit received [single 
life, joint and survivor, annuity certain and life].  
6 Michael Schroeder, “Pension Insurer Holds a Stake of  23.4% in UAL”, The Wall Street Journal, February 15,2006, 
p. A-10. 
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rights in the Mojave Valley.”  The agency has hired Pacholder Associates, a Cincinnati special 
assets manager, to dispose of  or manage these assets until sale. 7  
In addition to PBGC’s, subrogation rights to pension assets in terminated plans, is the issue of  
its claim on assets in bankrupt firms who place their unfunded pension plans with the agency. 
To what extent can PBGC argue that the pension holders in the firm are creditors entitled to a 
claim in the assets of  their bankrupt employer?   Private casualty insurance allows an insurer to 
take salvage after loss to reduce its overall claim costs.  Does PBGC have a legitimate right to 
take salvageable assets to help pay for the costs of  pension benefits to retirees in the bankrupt 
company?    If  PBGC were to be able to “pierce the corporate veil” between the assets of  the 
company and its unfunded pension liabilities, what would be the priority of  claims?   Several 
court cases over the years since 1980 have attempted to address these issues with varying results. 
The first case to come up in this area involved Facet Enterprises in 1976, a subsidiary of  Bendix 
Corporation.   Bendix wanted to spin off  the subsidiary in order to relieve itself  from any 
pension fund obligation to Facet workers by having the separated firm apply to PBGC for claims 
settlement.   In this case, the courts held that Bendix Corporation could not legally absolve itself  
from the pension obligations by spinning off  the bankrupt subsidiary.8  In 1984, during the 
rehabilitation of  the Baldwin-United insurance subsidiaries the question of  priority of  claims 
arose in relation to claims policyholders might have on the assets of  the parent company.   This 
issue was resolved when a rehabilitation plan was devised such that the policyholders were 
completely restored with an interest enhancement to cash values based on investment return and 
contributions from a number of  brokerage firms.9    More recently was the 1991 case involving 
LTV Corporation, in which the PBGC sought standing with the bankruptcy court in sharing in 
the claim on assets in the failing corporation.   However in that case, the judge ruled, “PBGC 
had no more priority than any unsecured creditor.” 10  In this instance, the limitation on PBGC’s 
ability to secure assets in LTV to defray the cost of  retirement benefits, added to the settlement 
costs of  the unfunded LTV pensions. From a microeconomic perspective, as PBGC claim costs 
rise, premiums need adjust to reflect the new experience, and healthier pensions will assume a 
disproportionate cost of  the losses from under funded plans.   Over time, the increased cost of  
retaining a defined benefit plan, for financially strong companies, may cause them to convert into 
a defined contribution plan in order to avoid higher PBGC premium payments. While PBGC’s 
 
7 Michael Schroeder, op.cit., p. A-10.
8 A. Frank Thompson, Anju Ramjee, and B. Ramjee, “Pension Valuation and Unfunded Liability Measurement: 
Financial Management Implications,” Proceedings of  the Risk Theory Seminar, University of  Southern California 
(May 1984), p.9; Another discussion of  this issue may be found in: Lucas and Hollowell, “Pension Accounting: The 
Liability Question,” Journal of  Accountancy, October 1981, pp. 57-66. 
9 Stanley Tulin, Daniel McCarthy, and Bruce Ogg, “A Report on the Financial Aspects of  the Rehabilitation Plan for 
National Investors Life Insurance Company, National Investors Pension Insurance Company, Mt. Hood Pension 
Insurance Company, National Equity Life Insurance Company, Inc. S&H Life Insurance Company, and University 
Life Insurance Company,” Milliman and Robertson, January 1984; and A. Frank Thompson, “Report on an Actuarial 
and Financial Analysis of  the Rehabilitation of  the Baldwin United Insurance Subsidiaries,” January 1984; Don 
Andriacco, “Baldwin Annuity Holders May Review Rehabilitation Plan,” The Cincinnati Post, January 18, 1984, 
p. 5B.   Dr. Thompson served as financial and actuarial expert for the policyholders in this rehabilitation case and 
raised the issue of  priority of  claims in relationship to “piercing the corporate veil,” in reference to policyholder 
interests. 
10 Kim Nauer, “Pension Agency Seeks Higher Claim Status in Chapter 11 Cases,” Commercial Law Bulletin, 
(November/December 1991), Volume 6, Issue 6, p. 10. 
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recoveries on pension assets has been improving over the past 3 years, gross claim costs have 
gone up far more than the amounts received from liquidating plan assets.  Table 3 provides a 
picture of  claim cost and recoveries for the past 15 years, which shows PBGC’s experience in 
recovering pension costs on terminated plans.
                                                 Table  3
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Terminations 
 Single Employer Plans: Standard and Trusteed 
                          1990 to 2004
---------------In Millions------------------
Standard Trusteed Gross Net
Year Terminations Terminations Claims Recoveries Claims
1990 11,800 101 $107.7 $7.6 $100.1
1991 8,600 175 $1,536.8 $230.8 $1,306.0
1992 6,670 157 $571.6 $157.7 $413.9
1993 5,320 124 $130.4 $13.3 $117.1
1994 3,950 135 $495.1 $35.0 $460.1
1995 3,870 121 $162.2 $7.1 $155.1
1996 3,809 96 $168.6 $32.0 $136.6
1997 3,497 82 $208.5 $11.8 $196.7
1998 2,475 63 $75.5 $5.9 $69.6
1999 1,969 76 $168.5 $13.1 $155.4
2000 1,882 72 $101.9 $15.3 $86.6
2001 1,565 110 $1,204.3 $183.8 $1,020.5
2002 1,214 177 $3,574.6 $234.6 $3,340.0
2003 1,119 140 $6,393.0 $131.7 $6,261.3
2004 1,189 96 $3,010.6 $325.4 $2,685.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data 
 Book 2004, “PBGC Terminations. . .Single Employer Program,”
 Table S-3, p. 28. 
In addition to issues related to the value of  pension assets received by PBGC from terminated 
plans, is the adequacy of  premium income to meet current benefit and administrative expenses. 
In order to maintain the short-term solvency of  PBGC, premiums should be adjusted to produce 
revenue income sufficient to meet the current obligations of  the corporation.  Table 4 provides 
information and analysis on this solvency issue. 
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                                                    Table  4
         Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation’s Premium Revenue and Net Premium
                                 Income over Benefits Paid and Other Expenses  
                                                   1985 to  2005
 
                         Premium             Benefit         Administrative         Premiums Less
Fiscal                Revenue            Payments       Other Expenses       Benefits+Expenses
Year                in Millions         in Millions          In Millions              In Millions
2005                   $1,451              $3,686                 $  342                     -$2,577
2004                   $1,458              $3,006                 $  288                     -$1,836
2003                   $   948              $2,488                 $  290                     -$1,830
2002                   $   787              $1,537                 $  225                     -$  975
2001                   $   821              $1,042                 $  184                     -$  405
2000                   $   807              $   902                 $  167                     -$  262
1999                   $   902              $   901                 $  161                     -$  160
1998                   $   966              $   847                 $  158                     -$    39
1997                   $1,067              $   823                 $  155                      $    89
1996                   $1,146              $   790                 $  150                      $  206
1995                   $   838              $   761                 $  138                     -$    61
1994                   $   955              $   719                 $  135                      $  101                 
1993                   $   890              $   720                 $  107                      $    63
1992                   $   875              $   634                 $    97                      $  144
1991                   $   741              $   514                 $    71                      $  156
1990                   $   659              $   369                 $    63                      $  227
1989                   $   603              $   353                 $    45                      $  205
1988                   $   465              $   357                 $    48                      $    60                 
1987                   $   268              $   300                 $    36                     -$    68
1986                   $   201              $   261                 $    33                     -$    93
1985                   $     82              $   170                 $    33                     -$   121
   
Annual % 
Decrease in PBGC Net Income versus Expenses: 1985-2005                                          16.52%
Annual % 
Decrease in PBGC Net Income versus Expenses: 1995-2005                                          20.58%
__________________________________________________________________________________    
                   
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, “Single Employer Data 
Tables,” Table S-2, p. 26; 2005 PBGC Annual Report, “Financial Statement Highlights,” p. 2 and “Statements of  
Operations and Changes in Net Position,” p. 20.
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In the years between 1985 and 1995, premium revenues were sufficient to cover current benefits 
and expenses in all but four years [see graph 1, in Appendix C].  However, after 1995, premium 
revenues were not enough to fund benefits and administrative expenses in all but two years. 
From an operations perspective, PBGC will need to increase premium rates significantly more 
than the pure risk rate, in order to overcome past operating deficits and meet future benefit 
obligations.  
Macroeconomic factors related to interest rates, unemployment, inflation, productivity, and 
aggregate demand for goods and services will impact PBGC funding and claim cost experience 
over time.   Internally, PBGC invests premium funds prior to their use in paying retiree claims. 
Part of  these invested assets are placed in interest bearing fixed income securities, another portion 
in equities.   In 2004, PBGC’s total return on investment was 8%, due in part to a 15% rate of  
return on equities against a 5.6% rate of  return on fixed-income securities.11  In 2004, PBGC 
adopted a new investment policy of  asset-liability maturity matching that has led to increasing 
investment in duration-matched fixed income instruments and a decrease in the percentage of  
PBGC assets in equities to between 15—25%.12 While this policy may limit PBGC’s interest rate 
risk exposure to market interest rates, it may not overcome macroeconomic risks associated with 
repricing of  securities and PBGC liabilities.   For example, in 2003 with the termination of  plans 
associated with Bethlehem Steel, National Steel and the U.S. Airlines Pilots due to deteriorating 
economic conditions in these industries, PBGC saw declining stock prices reduce the value of  
its assets, while lower market interest rates raised the present value of  PBGC’s future pension 
liabilities.13  The consequence of  these two macroeconomic factors was an increase in PBGC’s 
negative net financial position more than two-fold, from—$11.2 billion in 2002 to—$23.3 billion 
in 2003. 
Changes in unemployment and economic conditions within individual industries and geographic 
areas also dramatically impacts PBGC funding needs.   Table 5 shows PBGC’s claim distribution 
by industry type for the years 1975 to 2004.  Total claim experience appears heavily concentrated 
in primary metals, airline transportation, and other manufacturing sectors.  Out of  the 10 largest 
PBGC pension fund claims during this period, 5 were steel companies, 4 were airlines and the 
remaining firm was Kaiser Aluminum. 14 Taken together the three highest industry groups for 
PBGC claims experience represented 54.93% of  all losses paid from 1975 to 2004. 
11 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 2004 PBGC Annual Report, “Investment Activities,” p. 17. 
12 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, op.cit, p. 17. 
13 Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francisco, “The Present and Future of  Pension Insurance,” FRBSF Economic 
Letter, (August 29, 2003), No. 2003-25, pp. 1-2. 
14 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, Table S-5, p. 20. 
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                                                                 Table 5
                                  Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Claim Distribution by 
                                          Type of  Industry and Vested Participant 1975-2004
Total Claims Vested
Industry Description [In Millions] Distribution Participants Distribution
Agricultural, Mining, Construction $530,441 2.57% 39,321 2.81%
Manufacturing   
      Chemical & Allied Products $118,450 0.57% 9,102 0.65%
      Fabricated Metals $776,463 3.76% 76,154 5.44%
      Food and Tobacco $142,235 0.69% 26,390 1.88%
      Machinery and Computers $840,298 4.07% 79,049 5.64%
      Motor Vehicle Equipment $255,896 1.24% 27,582 1.97%
      Paper & Allied Products $137,795 0.67% 14,784 1.06%
      Primary Metals $10,995,512 53.26% 394,148 28.14%
      Rubber and Plastics $280,132 1.36% 22,863 1.63%
      Other Manufacturing $1,610,608 7.80% 237,174 16.93%
Transportation and Utilities   
      Air Transportation $2,857,632 13.84% 138,079 9.86%
      Other Transportation/Utilities $677,441 3.28% 62,264 4.45%
Wholesale Trade $408,187 1.98% 45,146 3.22%
Retail Trade $363,744 1.76% 121,086 8.64%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate $215,136 1.04% 22,945 1.64%
Services $435,344 2.11% 84,585 6.04%
Total Claim Costs $20,645,314 100.00% 1,400,672 100.00%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004,
“PBGC Claims by Industry Single Employer Program,” Table S-19, p. 44. 
  
Since many of  these industries are located within specific geographic areas across the U.S. the 
concentration of  PBGC benefit payments is centralized to states within the Mid-Atlantic and 
Great Lakes portions of  the country.   Table 6 provides a breakdown of  PBGC benefits paid 
by region for 2004.   In 2004, PBGC paid out $1.015 billion in benefits to program participants 
in the Mid-Atlantic States of  Delaware, Washington D.C., Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia.  In that same year, PBGC paid out $964 million in 
benefits to retirees in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin within the 
Great Lakes region of  the country.  Retiree payments to these two regions represented 65.87% 
of  PBGC’s claim costs in the year 2004. 
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                                                        Table 6
   PBGC Pension Benefits Paid by Region for Single Employer Plans in 2004
                           
                            Total Claims                                                                 2004
                            1975-2004                        Participants                   Benefits Paid
Region                [In Millions $]                    [In Millions]                  [In Millions $]
New England             965                              1.964                               140.753
Mid-Atlantic          10,009                              7.700                            1,015.801
Southeast                1,150                               6.434                              472.513
Great Lakes            5,748                               7.380                              964.213
Midwest                     428                              1.913                              109.631
Southwest                  811                              3.010                                99.261
Rocky Mountain        266                              1.063                                53.686
Pacific                     1,247                              4.871                              133.687
 
Totals:                  $20,605                             34.406                          $3,005.863 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, “PBGC Pension Data by Region 
and State: Single-Employer Program,” Table S-50, pp. 76-77.           
In addition to claim loss concentration by industry and geographical area, is the rise in significant 
large loss claims over the past few years.    Table 7 provides the distribution of  claim costs by 
terminated single employer plans from 1980 to 2004.  
                                                                   Table 7
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Claim Distribution by Termination
              Single Employer Plans 1980 to 2004
-------------------------------------------------Fiscal Year----------------------------------------
Claim  Total 
Size (x) 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-00 2000-04 Failures  
[In Millions] [#  Plans] [#  Plans] [#  Plans] [#  Plans] [#  Plans] [#  Plans]
% of  
Total
x <$ 1 537 451 532 304 274 2098 72.90%
$1<= x < $10 66 66 137 118 215 602 20.92%
$10<=x< $100 18 15 17 16 85 151 5.25%
$100<=x<$1,000 6 19 25 0.87%
X>= $1,000 2 2 0.07%
Terminations: 621 532 692 438 595 2878 100.00%
Source:  Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004,
“Single Employer Data Tables,” Table S-6, p. 31.
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Up until the period 2000 to 2004, there were few terminating pension plans assigned to PBGC 
with claim costs exceeding $1 billion. However, during this recent period, 2 plans terminated 
with costs exceeding the $1 billion threshold with an average claim loss of  $2.5 billion.   Table 
8 shows how just a few large loss claims can dramatically change PBGC’s dollar cost of  claims 
While claim loss frequency is still heaviest in loss categories less than $10 million [i.e., 92% of  
the total distribution in Table 7], the less frequent claims exceeding $1 billion dominate PBGC’s 
loss experience [25.68% of  PBGC losses in Table 8] for the period 1980 to 2004.  
                                                                       Table 8
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Dollar Claim Distribution




Size (x) 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-00 2000-04 Total Loss  
[In Millions] [In Millions] [In Millions] [In Millions] [In Millions] [In Millions] [In Millions] % of  Total
x <$ 1 $79,609 $75,747 $125,335 $94,796 $86,731 $462,218 2.27%
$1<= x < $10 $193,469 $217,215 $449,072 $307,857 $721,991 $1,889,604 9.28%
$10<=x< $100 $470,456 $424,363 $447,350 $380,580 $2,669,594 $4,392,343 21.58%
$100<=x<$1,000 $982,945 $1,819,858 $5,579,968 $8,382,771 41.19%
X>= $1,000 $5,226,177 $5,226,177 25.68%
Total Claim Costs $743,534 $1,700,270 $2,841,615 $783,233 $14,284,461 $20,353,113 100.00%
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Data Book 2004, 
“Single Employer Data Tables,” Table S-7, p. 32. 
  
Monthly retirement income to PBGC recipients varies significantly by age and gender according 
to 2004 statistics. Table 9 provides a breakdown of  PBGC monthly benefits for 2004 by age and 
gender. There are 2 ½ times as many male versus female payees and the average monthly benefit 
is a little over twice as much for males as females.   The age distribution is asymmetric for females 
with a greater proportion of  payments being made to those over 70.  For males, the greatest 
proportion of  payees is found between ages 65 and 80. Differences in mortality may explain 
part of  this variation as females have longer life expectancy and men may retire earlier due to 
age from manufacturing jobs.  Going forward, PBGC’s monthly benefit costs may increase as 
the numbers of  women earning salaries comparable to men enter the PBGC system. Another 
concern would be increases in longevity for men which might raise the proportion of  PBGC 
recipients in the age ranges beyond 75.          
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                                                              Table 9
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Age and Gender 
  of  Monthly Benefits for 2004 Single Employer Plans
Average  Average
Age of  Benefit Male Monthly Female Monthly
Recipient [x] Payees Distribution Benefit Payees Distribution Benefit
x < 60 58,692 11.36% $673 19,718 9.97% $361
60 <= x < 65 69,475 13.45% $586 20,966 10.61% $311
65 <= x < 70 88,349 17.10% $516 27,872 14.10% $254
70 <= x < 75 89,884 17.40% $478 31,480 15.92% $220
75 <= x < 80 85,853 16.62% $413 35,196 17.80% $197
80 <= x < 85 69,953 13.54% $359 33,336 16.86% $182
85 and older 54,460 10.54% $296 29,115 14.73% $155
Total 516,666 100.00% $475 197,683 100.00% $229
Note:  There are over 2 1/2 times as many male versus female payees, and the average
monthly benefit is a little over 2 times a much.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Pension Insurance Date Book 2004, 
“Single Employer Data Tables,” Table S-23, p. 48. 
Externalities Associated with the Provision of  PBGC Insurance
Economic externalities derived from PBGC insurance is an outgrowth of  its social welfare 
function, to provide retirement income to those who find themselves in bankrupt pension plans. 
While PBGC has been created to operate as a private insurer, the underwriting, sources of  
premium income, benefit levels, and reinsurance arrangements are subject to political process 
more than actuarial considerations.  The role of  government in determining PBGC benefit and 
premium structures, and how defined benefit plans are funded, plays a significant part in creating 
external economies and diseconomies for all defined benefit pension participants. Another 
factor creating externalities is the method used to account for pension liabilities under Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules.   
PBGC insurance is one segment of  the social insurance safety net used to provide a floor of  
income to U.S. retirees.  Benefit income provided by PBGC, along with social security, helps meet 
retirement expenses for those retirees in bankrupt plans.15   In the absence of  PBGC insurance, 
another form of  welfare to retirees in bankrupt plans would likely be provided through the 
government. Although PBGC receives premium income to help defray part of  its claim costs, 
the ultimate responsibility for paying claims may rest with the federal government.  Currently 
PBGC has a $100 million line of  credit with the Department of  the Treasury; however, that 
amount is likely to increase as claim costs rise above the assets PBGC has in reserve to meet its 
 
15 Zvi Bodie, “What the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation Can Learn from the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation,” Journal of  Financial Services Research, (March 1996), Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 87-88.
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retirement obligations. A similar situation played out in the late 1980’s when the FSLIC had a 
$750 million line of  credit on its deposit insurance coverage with the Treasury, and that amount 
was later raised to accommodate the large losses experienced with failing S&Ls.16 Consequently, 
the federal government is the insurer of  last resort and reinsurer to PBGC’s insurance program. 
Any excess loss above PBGC’s reserves to cover pension claims may require federal funding. 
Unlike other reinsurance agreements in the private market, PBGC’s arrangement is unique in that 
the reinsurer [federal government] may have unlimited liability.  Private reinsurers will cap the 
amount of  insured losses they accept on the basis of  their own insurance capacity.  A significant 
reason for this relationship rests with the notion of  the “too big to fail” theory of  government 
assistance to failing corporations. 17  In the past, federal aid to Chrysler, Lockheed Aircraft, Banks 
and S&Ls has been motivated by the perceived public need to maintain economic stability, a sound 
banking system and jobs in various regions of  the country.   Larger corporations who provided 
work to many American citizens and were mainstays to the U.S. economy, were considered too 
important to allow for failure. In the case of  the banking industry during the 1980’s, the federal 
government ultimately paid for the losses in FSLIC from failing S&Ls in order to prevent bank 
runs and re-establish confidence in the deposit insurance system.18   
The federal government’s role as a catastrophic reinsurer to PBGC coverage creates a number 
of  externalities between defined benefit pension participants.  First, the role of  PBGC in taking 
premiums sufficient to meet average experience and laying off  large loss exposure to the Treasury, 
allows for moral hazard relationships between PBGC, the Department of  the Treasury and 
corporate sponsors of  defined benefit plans.  Although PBGC premiums consist of  both a flat 
and variable rate component, the focus on setting premiums appears to be on meeting current 
claim experience, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.  In addition, due to the need to have Congressional 
approval for rate changes, premiums appear to lag experience when it comes to covering PBGC 
claim costs.  For example, the years when PBGC enjoyed a positive net financial position in 
Table 1[1996-2001] coincide with the decision in 1996 to raise the variable rate premium to a 
maximum level on unfunded pension liabilities [Table 2].     Given the circumstances, PBGC will 
need to set a retention limit on those claims that can be paid from premium income based on 
governmentally approved rates.  The theory behind setting a retention limit on PBGC coverage 
is contained in Appendix A. 
Since rates are not charged in relation to the actual cost of  coverage consisting of  average loss 
plus a loading for large loss exposure, corporate sponsors pay less than an actuarial defined 
 
16 A. Frank Thompson, “An Actuarial Perspective on the Adequacy of  the FSLIC Fund,” Office of  Policy and 
Economic Research, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Research Working Paper No. 102, (1981), pp. 36-37; 
Thompson, Andrew F., Prasad Medury, A. Ramjee, and B. Ramjee, “An Actuarial Approach to the Analysis of  
Post Deregulation Thrift Failures in the U.S.A.,” Proceedings of  the Actuarial Conference on Financial Institutions Risks 
Colloquium, Vol. I(1990), Paris, France. 
17 Eugene F. Brigham and Michael C. Ehrhardt, Financial Management: Theory and Practice, 11th Edition,(Cincinnati, 
Ohio:Southwestern Publishing, 2005), pp. 815-816. 
18 See discussion of  the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of  1989, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of  1991 (FDICIA) in Donald Fraser, Benton Gup, 
and James W. Kolari, Commercial Banking: The Management of  Risk, (Cincinnati, Ohio: Southwestern Publishing, 
2001), pp. 42-45.  For a analysis of  what happens when confidence is shaken in a bank insurer see: Linda E. Bowyer, 
A. Frank Thompson, Venkat Srinivasan, “The Ohio Banking Crisis: A Lesson in Consumer Finance,” The Journal 
of  Consumer Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2(1986), pp. 290-299. 
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premium.  Therefore, corporate sponsors may feel free to assume higher investment and funding 
risks to their plans, knowing that ultimately PBGC and the federal government provides coverage 
against loss at a bargain rate.  For example, despite evidence that pension assets invested in 
equities increase risk and instability for funding defined benefit plans, many U.S. plans have 
a majority of  their plan assets assigned to equities.19  This type of  adverse selection creates 
externalities amongst corporate sponsors.  Healthier corporate plans that have conservatively 
invested pension assets and little or no unfunded pension liabilities, pay flat premium rates that 
subsidize riskier pension plans through PBGC insurance. 
In some cases, PBGC contributes to the creation of  externalities by writing favorable regulations 
to allow for credits from current increases in corporate pension assets to reduce funding 
requirements for meeting significant pension under funding. For instance, neither Bethlehem 
Steel nor U.S. Airways were required to make cash contributions in the years leading up to their 
pension plan terminations, and surprisingly, notwithstanding the fact that the United Airlines 
pilots’ plan was under funded by nearly $3 billion, the UAL was not required to make plan 
contributions for 1996 to 2004, the few years prior to plan termination. 20    The impact of  such 
a credit policy allows under funding to remain in place, for plans having significant deficits, while 
PBGC continues charging premiums below the cost of  coverage.   Eventually, this externality 
gets absorbed into higher flat and variable premiums, as Congress recognizes premiums need 
to be increased in order to meet current claim experience, as occurred after 1996.  The PBGC 
premium increases produce an economic cost to the healthier plans and PBGC itself.  Higher 
premiums add to the corporate cost of  providing a defined benefit plan, thereby leading to 
decisions about plan size and type of  benefits offered.  Appendix B provides an examination 
of  these external relationships using the economic theory of  clubs.  As premiums increase, the 
probability that fully funded pension plans will convert to defined contribution programs and 
leave PBGC, rises.   As the base of  support for premium income erodes with the departure of  
well funded pension plans, the ability of  PBGC to increase premiums on poorer plans becomes 
limited.  Charging higher PBGC premiums to the remaining unfunded pension plans may only 
serve to accelerate their path to bankruptcy and assignment of  pension liabilities to PBGC. 21
Accounting and actuarial rules may also contribute to the creation of  externalities between 
pension plan participants, corporate sponsors, PBGC and the federal government as reinsurer. 
When determining a defined benefit pension liability, accountants rely on actuarial assumptions 
about future wage rates and an interest assumption to discount future pension obligations back 
 
19 Jeremy Gold, “Accounting/Actuarial Bias Enables Equity Investment by Defined Benefit Pension Plans,” North 
American Actuarial Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (July 2005), pp. 1-2. 
20 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, “The Impact of  Pension Reform Proposals on Claims Against the 
Pension Insurance Program, Losses to Participants and Contributions, October 26, 2005, pp. 29-30. The original 
white paper can be referenced at: http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/wp 040605.pdf
21 The relationship of  the size of  an unfunded pension liability and limitations to setting risk adjusted premiums is 
similar to setting variable deposit insurance premiums relative to net worth position for financial institutions such as 
S&Ls.   For a theoretical discussion of  this issue see: Thompson, Andrew F., Linda E. Bowyer, and A. Bhattacharya, 
“Theoretical Propositions on the Effect Minimum Net Worth Requirements have on Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
for Stock S&Ls,” Invited Federal Home Loan Research Working Paper No. 51, Office of  Policy and Economic Research, 
Washington, D.C. (March 1985), pp. 1-11.
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to the present.22  Actuarially, an unfunded pension liability represents the extent the present value 
of  future benefit obligations exceed the present value of  plan assets.  An actuarially conservative 
low discount rate assumption may require greater funding of  a pension deficit, while a higher 
rate assumption may reduce projected unfunded pension liabilities allowing for a lesser funding 
requirement.  In addition, in order to get to a valuation of  the pension obligation, assumptions 
must also be made with respect to future rates of  withdrawal, inflation and changes in salary 
compensation.   Under FASB accounting rules, corporate pension sponsors have the flexibility 
to change these assumptions which lead to alterations in the pension fund liability.   Higher 
withdrawal rates may result in less long term funding of  pension liabilities, if  cateris paribus, 
inflation and salary changes were somewhat benign.  On the other hand, if  withdrawal rates 
remained constant over time, but inflation or salary compensation grew dramatically, this might 
cause pension liabilities to increase dramatically. 
In order to address pension funding issues, and the need for accounting transparency with 
respect to the accuracy of  financial statements, FASB promulgated several accounting rules 
[FASB Statements 5, 35,36,87, 88 and 132; APB Opinion 8] to improve pension reporting.23 
During the early 1980’s FASB statements 87 and 88 were issued and these accounting rules 
allowed corporate sponsors to select from any of  five different actuarial methods for costing 
the accrued liabilities in a defined benefit plan [Accrued Benefit Cost{unit cost}, Entry Age 
Normal, Modified Accrued Benefit, Projected Unit Credit and Attained Age Cost].   Depending 
on which of  these methods was selected and how long they remained in place, a firm could 
show that their pension plan had either a surplus or deficit depending upon which actuarial 
assumptions were used for inflation, withdrawals, salary benefit structure and discount rate.24 
Eventually, this difficulty was recognized by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 2003 
when an amended Statement 132 was issued.    In that statement FASB moved away from all 
cost approaches to benefit methodologies in determining plan liabilities.   Under the benefit 
methods, a determination is made of  future benefits attributable to employee service in the 
present reporting year with the cost equal to the actuarial value of  those future benefits.   This 
liability represents the difference between the cost of  the benefits against the current value of  
the pension’s assets, marked to market.25 
While adoption of  this new reporting requirement may be an improvement over allowing 
employers to pick and choose from five actuarial cost methods over time, externalities  remain with 
the family of  benefit costing methods that may create difficulties for PBGC, plan participants and 
the federal government as reinsurer.  For example, in calculating service benefits, the corporate 
sponsor will need to make an assumption about the number of  expected years of  service for 
each employee.  Such an assumption allows a future benefit calculation to be determined on the 
 
22 A. Frank Thompson, Yong H. Kim, and Philip W. Glasgo, “Pension Liability Reporting under ERISA,”  Employee 
Benefits Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 1 (March 1983), pp. 1-28.  
23 FASB statements can be accessed at: www.fasb.org on the web.  FASB 132 is the latest statement to address 
accounting for defined benefit pension plans as was issued in 1998 and significantly revised in the area of  actuarial 
costing in 2003.  
24 Thompson, Kim, and Glasgo, op.cit, 2-7..  This particular article shows how changing actuarial cost methods 
and/or altering discount or wage rate assumptions pension liabilities can vary dramatically causing the accounting 
liability to vary significantly over time.   
25 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 132 Amended 2003, op.cit., pp. 40-45.
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basis of  years of  service and the salary benefit formula [e.g. career average, final year’s salary, 
final salary over the past 5 years].  However, corporate sponsors have latitude in what type of  
assumption might be made with respect to years of  service.   One method might be to assume an 
equal distribution of  expected future years of  service over the workforce [e.g. 100 employees who 
are expected to leave at a constant rate over 20 years {5 workers each year}].  The amortization 
of  unrecognized prior service costs would be accelerated in early service years under such a 
configuration.  However, should actual withdrawal rates become slower in early service periods 
than what is projected with the constant rate formulation, the amortization might prove to 
be too little over time.  26   Higher unfunded liabilities would increase pension plan risks for 
participants, PBGC insurance, and the excess loss coverage supplied by the federal government 
through the Treasury’s line of  credit.   Further complicating this type of  accounting for pension 
costs is the flexibility corporate sponsors have in selecting and switching to a new method of  
recognition for prior service.   To follow up, if  an employer were to select the straight line 
amortization approach with averaging over the remaining service period, the unfunded liability 
might be drawn down much more quickly.27   It would appear that corporate sponsors might have 
some incentive to switch plan assumptions with respect to benefit method for recognizing prior 
service costs, based on their interest in fully funding their plan.   The corporate sponsors decision 
would be independent of  PBGC’s premium structure, and the federal government’s coverage of  
large losses to insured pensions.  A corporate sponsor could switch plan assumptions, reduce 
unfunded pension liabilities, minimize PBGC premiums and actually have higher risk of  plan 
termination. 
 
While the revised FASB Statement Number 132 does address some important issues related to 
fully recognizing pension plan costs, the lack of  a requirement for sensitivity analysis on plan 
assumptions creates further externalities for PBGC and workers.28  The purpose of  sensitivity 
analysis would be to expose the cost calculations to changes in economic, actuarial and financial 
variables that impact pension funding liabilities.29   Sensitivity analysis might allow PBGC to 
better understand the robustness of  the cost calculations to determine its financial risk of  
acquiring a terminated plan in the future.   In addition, without sensitivity analysis to determine 
key factors that might influence the long-term survival of  a pension plan, workers might not be 
able to assess the strength of  their retirement plan in order to make personal choices about other 
retirement programs [e.g. Roth, Traditional IRA funding].
26 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of  Accounting Standards No. 87, 1985, pp. 75-77. 
27 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Ibid., pp. 77-79. 
28 Financial Accounting Standards Board, op. cit., p. 27. 
29  Such sensitivity analysis was of  significant importance in guaranteeing a return of  vested benefits to all policyholders 
in the case of  the Baldwin-United rehabilitation; see: Stanley Tulin, Daniel McCarthy, and Bruce Ogg, “A Report on 
the Financial Aspects of  the Rehabilitation Plan for National Investors Life Insurance Company, National Investors 
Pension Insurance Company, Mt. Hood Pension Insurance Company, National Equity Life Insurance Company, 
Inc. S&H Life Insurance Company, and University Life Insurance Company,” Milliman and Robertson, January 
1984; and A. Frank Thompson, “Report on an Actuarial and Financial Analysis of  the Rehabilitation of  the Baldwin 
United Insurance Subsidiaries,” January 1984.
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Perspectives and Conclusions Relating to the Actuarial Adequacy of  PBGC
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation provides insurance coverage to American workers who 
participate in defined benefit plans managed by the companies where they find employment. 
The corporate sponsors offer these plans as a form of  deferred compensation to workers, and 
managers are free to configure their programs and account costs based on current regulations 
and accounting rules.   PBGC prices coverage, receives and invests premiums, at levels below 
long term claims experience.  For the past ten years, PBGC’s deficit financial position has been 
growing at an accelerating rate. During the past two years, PBGC has faced a couple of  large 
loss claims that seem to have greatly increased pension losses and reserve credibility.   It does 
not appear that PBGC’s current premium structure will allow it to overcome its $22 billion 
deficit anytime soon.  The current proposed changes, coming out of  the recently enacted Deficit 
Reduction Act of  2006, may reduce the deficit, but as premium rates increase certain externalities 
may result in lower PBGC funding.  For example, higher premiums may encourage better pension 
plans to voluntarily convert to defined contribution plans thereby escaping the tax.  At the same 
time, higher premiums could increase expenses for already weak plans to the point where the 
corporate sponsor files for bankruptcy and puts its pension to PBGC.   
If  PBGC is to remain viable as an insurer and the reinsurer [federal government] is to have 
limited exposure to catastrophic loss, the welfare function would have to be decoupled from 
the insurance coverage.   The insurance aspects of  PBGC coverage is to protect workers from 
loss due to what might be termed normal experience.   Pension losses that are predictable, and 
to some extent unchanging over time, can be readily measured with the risks diversified over 
a large group of  workers may be adequately covered through an insurance program.  Within 
PBGC’s past loss experience, there have been times when insurance coverage fit this description 
[e.g. 1980-1995].  In order for there to be discipline between PBGC underwriting, and reserving, 
premiums for these types of  losses would need to be set actuarially based on identifiable pension 
plan risks.  Adjustments would in all likelihood have to be made annually not once every 10 
years. 
The other, implicit component to PBGC insurance, is the welfare aspects provided by making 
sure large numbers of  pension participants are guaranteed retirement benefits that are sufficient 
to meet basic retirement needs.  This welfare function might best be financed, not under the 
guise of  an insurance premium, but rather a progressive tax.  One such possibility would be 
to develop a tax on gross executive compensation above a threshold amount or the value of  
executive stock options received at year’s end.   One could argue that a contributing factor to 
PBGC current catastrophic loss component may be the managerial decisions made by corporate 
executives in failing to adequately fund pension liabilities in the plans they control.  Laying aside 
the political ramifications of  such a proposal, the extent of  the tax would have to be determined 
on the basis of  the amount of  catastrophic loss assigned to PBGC, the tax rate and the value of  
compensation to be taxed.   
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Appendix A
 A Theoretical Model for Determining PBGC’s Retention Limit on 
                            Insuring Defined Benefit Pension Plans30
In order for PBGC to remain viable as an insurer, premiums must be sufficient to cover: 
(1) current loss experience and (2) claims that can reasonably be expected in the future.  A pure 
risk premium representing the expected value of  future losses, funds current claims while the 
loading is used to provide for administrative expenses and reserving for incurred but not yet 
reported loss.  Before PBGC can determine an adequate premium rate, it must first decide on 
how much coverage to retain.  The retention represents a maximum amount of  coverage PBGC 
can reasonably reserve, based on premiums and investment return.    Insuring defined benefit 
pensions involves two risks: (1) investment risk associated with the return on pension securities 
and (2) management risk which relates to the ability to adequately set aside funds to meet pension 
obligations.  Each of  these risks may depend upon exogenous economic conditions over time. 
The dynamic and fundamental nature of  these risks are such that PBGC may be unable to 
retain responsibility for catastrophic coverage should large pension losses to entire companies 
or industries occur.  Currently, the PBGC has a $100 million statutory line of  credit with the 
U.S. Treasury Department which could be used to maintain liquidity should there be massive 
withdrawals to the corporation.31   To remain viable, PBGC needs to price its insurance in such 
a way that the agency’s capacity to retain insurance will increase with the size of  its reserves.  A 
dynamic control model will be used to identify the relationships involved in determining PBGC’s 
retention limit on insuring defined benefit plans.
One way of  examining the impact operating capacity has on insurance retention is to view 
PBGC as a primary insurer seeking to cede [transfer] excess loss insurance to an outside reinsurer 
[U.S. Treasury Department].  In addition to quantifying the connection between retention limit 
and PBGC reserve size, such a model may prove useful in determining a suitable credit line for 
excess coverage.  PBGC’s investment funds can be divided into two parts.  One consisting of  
technical reserves R’ to meet current claim experience.   The other fund represents longer term, 
free reserves R” used to meet unexpected adverse loss away from expected results.32  R” directly 
relates to the amount of  insurance PBGC can absorb in its risk portfolio.  
30 This material is based on results first reported in, A. Frank Thompson, Anju Ramjee, and B. Ramjee, “Pension 
Valuation and Unfunded Liability Measurement: Financial Management Implications,” Proceedings of  the Risk 
Theory Seminar, University of  Southern California (May 1984), and cited in Linda J. Martin, and A. Jeremy Ifflander, 
Pension Fund Perspectives,  Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4(July/August 1984), pp. 10-11. The control 
model is an extension of  one first developed in A. Bensoussan, E. Gerald Hurst, Jr. and B. Naslund, Management 
Applications of  Modern Control Theory, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1974), 
pp. 111-129. 
31 Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francisco, FRBSF Economic Letter, “The Present and Future of  Pension 
Insurance,”No. 2003-25, August 29, 2003, p. 2; also found in: http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/
letter/2003/el2003-25.html
32 Let  F(x)  = the cumulative claims distribution function which represents the probability that the amount of  claims 
paid under PBGC insurance will not exceed the random variable x.  R’ =  ∫0
∞  x F’(x) dx  the technical reserve and R” 
= a safety reserve, an amount held in addition to R’ used to meet contingent losses greater than expected claims. 
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Let,                   K1(t)  = the amount in R
’ at time t. 
                
                         K2(t)  = the amount in R” at time t.  
These two reserve funds will earn individual interest rates of  return δ1 and δ2 over time.  Thus, 
  δ1(t) = the short-term interest rate on funds held in K1, 
  δ2(t)  =the long-term rate on fixed income investments in K2,
  δ3(t)  =the long-term rate capital appreciation rate on funds in K2.
If  F[x(t)] represents the cumulative claims distribution function,  then the technical reserve for 
meeting expected claims is: 
                                                  ∞ 
   d(t) =   ∫0    [ x(t)] F’[x(t)] dt
where x(t) = K1(t) + K2(t) + P(t)    and   P(t) = PBGC premium income in period t while
d(t) represents PBGC’s demand for cash to meet claims in period t, [d(t) ε [0,∞)].  The controller 
is u(t), the amount of  insurance coverage PBGC cedes to the U.S. Department of  the Treasury 
through credit line in time t.   |u(t)| < M, where M is an upper bound on the amount of  credit 
that PBGC can draw upon in any time period.  In this case M would be equal to $100 million. 
The set of  state equations are: 
             .
 K1(t) =  δ1(t) · K1(t) – d(t) + u(t) – α |u(t)| + δ2(t) · K2(t)        (1)
             .
 K2(t) =  δ3(t) · K2(t) –  u(t)                                                        (2)
                                                                                                  .
According to equation (1), a change in the technical reserve, K1(t)   results from: 
(i) a short term interest return δ1(t) · K1(t) 
(ii) a decrement d(t) based on the payment of  claims at time t
(iii) an increase (or decrease) by using the credit line u(t)
(iv) a payment of  transactions costs for the use of  the credit line α |u(t)| , and
(v) a short term return on fixed income assets δ2(t) · K2(t) .
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Differential equation (2) represents changes to the long term safety reserve, K2(t) from: 
(i) an increase (or decrease) in the long-term value of  safety reserve assets
δ3(t) · K2(t) , and 
(ii) a decrease caused by the use of  the PBGC credit line with the 
U.S. Department of  the Treasury  [ -u(t)].
 
PBGC’s objective is to maximize the amount of  money in reserve to meet its claim experience, 
therefore the goal is to maximize the functional [K1(t) + K2(t)] with respect to the controller u(t) 
over time subject to the state equations (1) and (2).   The canonical representation of  this system 
is given as: 
                                   →
 Max { [1,1] · K(t)}
SUBJECT TO: 
   →                  →
 K(t)   =   A · K(t)  + b · u(t) + c                                           (3) 
Where: 
            →
 K(t)  =  [K1(t) , K2(t)]’    ,
                                
                      ┌  δ1(t)      δ2(t)      0  ┐
        A     =        |                            |
                      └   0         0       δ3(t) ┘
        b  =        [ 1 -  α ,  -1]’   , and    c  =    [ -d(t) ,  0]’, 
with claims experience d(t) exogenously defined.   PBGC wants to find the optimal
decision rule u*(t) from a set of  rules {ui, for all i = 1,2,3, . . . n}, which leads to a
maximum value for [K1(t) + K2(t)] at terminal time T [the length of  PBGC’s planning
horizon].  
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Selecting any ui(t)  leads to some terminal value for [K1(t) + K2(t)].  The set of  admissible
                                                                                                                 →
controls  ui(t)  is bounded by M, and the state system is linear in u(t) and K(t) which
guarantees a unique solution.   The Hamiltonian can be defined as: 
 H[K1(t), K2(t), p1(t), p2(t), u(t),t]  =                                            (4)
                  
                 p1(t) { δ1(t) · K1(t) – d(t) + u(t) – α |u(t)| + δ2(t) · K2(t)} 
 +   p2(t) { δ3(t) · K2(t) –  u(t)}
where p1(t), and p2(t) are co-state or shadow price variables.  Applying Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, an optimal policy can be obtained from the linear system of  
equations defined by: 
∂H[K1(t), K2(t), p1(t), p2(t), u(t),t]   =  0
∂u
The controller u(t) can take on both positive or negative values depending on whether PBGC is 
using or restoring its $100 million credit line in time t.   Since |u(t)| is a discontinuous function, 
it is not possible to directly differentiate H.  However, by suitably defining u(t) a derivative can 
be obtained over a finite interval.  Let: 
                              u + (t)   -  u – (t)          
 u(t)      =                                   for all u + (t) >= 0,  u – (t)  >= 0
                              u + (t) · u – (t) = 0
The decomposed controller u(t) has the following graphical configuration: 
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u(t) =  u + (t), whenever PBGC is using their credit line with the Treasury, 
u(t) =  u – (t), whenever PBGC is restoring its line of  credit with the Treasury, 
u(t) = 0, whenever PBGC is able to meet all its claim experience through premium 
income and is not using the line of  credit with the Treasury.  Under this new formulation the 
Hamiltonian is redefined as: 
 H[K1(t), K2(t), p1(t), p2(t), u(t),t]                                                                  (5) 
   = p1(t) { δ1(t) · K1(t) – d(t) + [u 
+ (t) - u – (t)] – α [u + (t) - u – (t)] + δ2(t) · K2(t)}
                  + p2(t) { δ3(t) · K2(t) – [u 
+ (t) - u – (t)]  }
Maximizing the functional H with respect to u + (t) and u – (t) :
 ∂H                =    [ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t)                                                             (6)
 ∂ u+(t)
 ∂H                 = -[ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t)                                                             (7)
 ∂ u–(t)
Since H is linear in u+(t) and u–(t) the solution defines an on-off  or what is known as a bang-
bang switching policy where: 
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                             ┌ M  if   ∂H         >  0 ,  [ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t) > 0 
                                       ∂ u+(t)         
┌ M  if   ∂H         >  0 ,  [ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t) > 0 
                                       ∂ u+(t)         
          u+(t)     = 
                              └0  if   [ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t) < 0. 
                               ┌ -M  if    ∂H       >    0,  -[ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t) > 0,
                                             ∂ u–(t)
 u–(t)  =    
                                └ 0   if   -[ 1 – α ] p1(t) - p2(t)  <  0.
PBGC will  utilize the credit line whenever [ 1 – α ] p1(t) > p2(t) and will attain more insurance 
capacity by restoring the line when p2(t) > [ 1 – α ] p1(t).   The values of  the co-state or shadow 
variables p1(t) and p2(t) may be found by examining the system of  adjoint equations defined to 
be: 
            .                 
 p1(t)   =   -∂H                                                                       (8)
                             ∂K1(t)
            .
 p2(t)    =   -∂H                                                                      (9)
                             ∂K2(t)
 .
 p1(t)  =   -[ δ1(t) p1(t)]                                                           (10)
 .
 p2(t)   =  -[ δ2(t) p1(t) + δ3(t) p2(t)]                                             (11)
Solving (10) for  p1(t): 
 .
 p1(t)      =    - δ1(t)    and integrating both sides over the closed interval [t,T]
 p1(t)
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                    .
 ∫tT  [p1(t)/ p1(t)] dt   =      - ∫t T  δ1(t) dt,  which implies that
 ln[p1(t)]t
T     =      - ∫t T  δ1(t) dt, and 
                                  ∫t T  δ1(t) dt    
 p1(t)    =     e                  given that p1(T) = 1.                (12)
Substituting equation (12) into (11): 
 .                 ∫t T  δ1(t) dt
 p2(t)   =   -δ2(t) e                       -   δ3(t) p2(t)                               (13)
Using the boundary condition that p2(T) = 1 and an application of  the variation of  parameters 
formula on this nonhomogeneous linear differential equation:33
        ∫t T δ3(t) dt                            [∫t T δ1(s) ds +  ∫t T δ3(u) du]
 p2(t)  =  e               - ∫t T  δ2(t)  e                                  dt      (14)
This model describes a risk retention policy for PBGC consistent with the goal of  optimizing 
insurance capacity over time.   Given PBGC’s retention limit M, claims experience d(t), a time 
optimal policy for using the Treasury line of  credit on an excess loss basis is defined by equations 
(6), (7), (12), and (14).  Since M and d(t) are exogeneous variables, PBGC can perform sensitivity 
analysis on the optimal solution by varying these two parameters to determine their impact on 
K(t).   Testing of  a solution in this way will indicate how dramatically PBGC’s retention limit 
(M) may change as a result of  increasing or decreasing claim experience [d(t)].  Such analysis may 
provide an indication of  the adequacy of  the size of  the retention limit based on number and 
size of  recent claims.   
 
33 See: www.cbu.edu/~wschrein/media/DE/Errata04.pdf#search=’variation%20of%20parameters%20formula 
The theorem is as follows:  The solution of: 
               .
 x  + a(t)x  = q(t), x(t0) = x0  is given by the variation of  parameters formula: 
                                                                                              - ∫t T a(u) du
  x(t)  =  z(t, t0)x0 +  ∫t T z(t,s) ds, where z(t,s) =  e
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Appendix    B
Analysis of  the Externalities Involved in Providing Defined Benefit Pension
Benefits34
 Pensions are a method of  compensation between firms and workers, whereby external 
benefits are exchanged for services.   Employees provide work in return for deferred compensation 
in the form of  retirement benefits.   Workers accept this form of  remuneration as long as there 
is reason to believe that benefits received in the future exceed foregone salary today.  Workers 
would not accept this relationship if  there was reason to believe the employer might default on 
retirement obligations. Firms will continue to maintain a defined benefit pension plan, as long 
as, the costs of  providing benefits do not exceed productivity gains from offering the additional 
compensation.  Pension plans are a voluntary means for employers to pay workers an implicit 
wage in the form of  retirement income.   Tax law relating to the expensing of  pension costs, and 
deferral of  taxes on pension asset accumulations allow employers to provide additional income 
to workers at lower cost.   On the other hand, if  the cost of  the pension plan exceeds the firm’s 
budget constraints for such benefits, then the plan may either be restructured or eliminated. 
Recent benefit reductions for pensioners in the Airline industry are indicative of  these motivations 
for changing plan structure.   Alternatively, large asset accumulations to a pension plan over time 
may motivate restructuring.  In this case, if  the present value of  the plan’s future obligations is 
significantly less than the cost of  freezing benefits, annuitizing pension benefits, and converting 
to a new plan, the company may make the change and book all asset gains as an extraordinary 
income item. In the mid-1990’s companies such as IBM completed these conversions to free up 
cash on the balance sheet.  Consequently, tax policy, funding arrangements, investment risk, and 
salary considerations may create externalities between employees as beneficiaries of  a pension, 
and employers who are providers.  
 Employee defined benefit pensions depend on two factors.  The type of  benefit paid 
to workers based on company employment, and the number of  employees who share in the 
pension fund.   Consequently, a worker’s utility function may be described as:35
    
 Upb  =      Upb[B1, B2, . . . . BN,N]
 
 Upb  =  Upb[B1, N] + U
pb[B2, N] + . . .  U
pb[BN, N]                                          (1) 
 
34 This material is an updated version of  analysis originally presented in: A. Frank Thompson, Anju Ramjee, 
and B. Ramjee, “Pension Valuation and Unfunded Liability Measurement: Financial Management Implications,” 
Proceedings of  the Risk Theory Seminar, University of  Southern California (May 1984).
35 James M. Buchanan, and William Craig Stubblebine, “Externality,” Economica, (November 1962), 
pp. 371- 372. 
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Where:   Upb  =  a twice differentiable, separable utility function, 
               Bi    =  the amount of  deferred retirement benefits accorded to worker I,
               N     =  the number of  members in the defined benefit plan. 
The firm’s cost function may be denoted as: 
 Fpc  =   Fpc[ (B1,N), (B2,N), . . . (BN,N)
 Fpc   =  Fpc(B1,N) + F
pc(B2,N) + . . . + F
pc(BN,N)                                            (2) 
Where Fpc is a twice differentiable, separable function.  Given these functional relationships, an 
analogy may be made between a defined benefit pension plan and an economic club.36  The cost 
of  providing pension benefits to the group depends on the benefits to each worker based on 
their activities, Bi , and the number of  pension participants, N.  The addition of  new workers 
will affect the cost of  providing benefits.  The larger the membership in the pension, the lower 
the cost of  any single member, given the firm’s funding constraint.  The size of  the pension 
(economic club) determines the level of  benefits that may be supplied to workers.  Membership 
in the pension is an externality for both the employer and employee. The employer provides 
deferred compensation in the form of  retirement benefits that are contingent on the number of  
participants, length of  employment, number of  withdrawals, type and cost of  benefits based on 
salary.   The worker’s benefits are determined related to pension fund claims which depend on 
management’s ability to maintain the solvency and health of  the defined benefit plan.
Given these relationships, we can form a Lagrangean to determine the conditions for 
maximizing the utility of  pension plan participants, subject to the firm’s funding constraint. 
 L   =   Upb[B1, N] + U
pb[B2, N] + . . .  U
pb[BN, N]
                                   _  
                            + λ {F – [Fpc(B1,N) + F
pc(B2,N) + . . . + F
pc(BN,N)]}                      (3)
          
where F  is the least upper bound on the amount a firm would be willing to absorb in pension 
costs [i.e., pension expense, plus premium on PBGC insurance].
36 The following analysis is based on the economic theory of  clubs, see James M. Buchanan, “An Economic Theory 
of  Clubs,” Economica, (February 1965), pp. 1-14.
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First order maximization conditions are: 
 ∂L     =     ∂ Upb[Bi, N]   -  λ ∂ F
pc(Bi,N)   =     0                                       (4)
 ∂Bi            ∂ Bi                     ∂ Bi
For all I = 1,2,. . . .,N 
                               N
 ∂L       =    ∑ [  ∂ Upb[Bi, N]   - λ [∂ Fpc(Bi,N) ]  = 0                               (5) 
            ∂N             i=1   ∂N                         ∂N
The set of  equations described by (4) implies that: 
 
 ∂ Upb       =     ∂ Fpc              for all i,j = 1,2,. . .,N                                      (6) 
 ∂ Bi                 ∂ Bi  
                 ----------                    ---------- 
           ∂ Upb               ∂ Fpc      
           ∂ Bj                  ∂ Bj     
the marginal rates of  substitution for benefits Bi and Bj must equal the marginal rates of  substation 
of  the pension costs for those same benefits in exchange.37  Marginal differences between Bi and 
Bj may be due to higher wages, alteration in benefit formulas or greater productivity of  one 
worker over another.   Further, using (4) and (5) [based on equality of  λ: 
            N
 ∑  ∂ Upb[Bi, N]                     ∂ Upb[Bi, N]  
           i=1 ∂N                                     ∂Bi
          --------------------        =         ------------------                                                (7)
            N
 ∑  ∂ Fpc(Bi,N)                        ∂ Fpc(Bi,N)
           i=1 ∂N                                      ∂Bi 
 
37  ∂upb  =  λ∂Fpc,   ∂upb  = λ∂Fpc    implies,  
  ∂Bi               ∂Bi        ∂Bj            ∂Bj  
   ∂upb     λ∂Fpc       ===         ∂upb        ∂Fpc      
   ∂Bi         ∂Bi                             ∂Bi         ∂Bi
 ------  =   ------                           ------  = ------
   ∂upb      λ∂Fpc                            ∂upb        ∂Fpc
    ∂Bj         ∂Bj                             ∂Bj         ∂Bj
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which leads to: 
            N                                      N
 ∑  ∂ Upb[Bi, N]               ∑  ∂ Fpc(Bi,N)                                                           (8)
           i=1 ∂N                             i=1 ∂N 
         --------------------     =      ---------------------
            ∂ Upb[Bi, N]                      ∂ F
pc(Bi,N)
            ∂Bi                                                       ∂Bi
so that the marginal rate of  substitution in a pension with N participants receiving benefit Bi 
must equal the marginal rates of  substitution of  the cost of  providing benefit Bi in the group.    
The implication from conditions (7) and (8) is that the firm will be motivated to add new workers 
up to the point where the marginal benefits from providing employment just equals the marginal 
costs incurred in funding the extra retirement income.  As a consequence, factors that increase 
pension costs may directly impact the firm’s hiring decisions and its capital to labor ratio. If  
pension costs increase either due to changes in benefit levels, increases in PBGC premiums, or 
alteration of  the actuarial cost method, firms may seek to reduce the number of  members in the 
pension (economic club).   Recent labor force reductions at U.S. Airways, United Airlines, Delta, 
GM and Ford may serve to illustrate this relationship.   
To better understand these externalities, consider the following classical maximization problem: 
 Max [Φ(L,K)]
Subject to:  C(L,K) =  γK    +   {β1 + (1-t)[ β2 + β3]}L
Where:    Φ(L,K) is a twice differentiable production function which describes the technical 
relationships between capital, K and labor, L.  C(L,K) is a linear, differentiable function of  cost 
based on capital and labor as inputs of  production.   γ    = the payment per unit of  capital.     β1  
= the direct wage to each unit of  labor.  β2  = the pension funding expense per unit of  labor and 
β3 = the cost of  the PBGC premium per unit of  labor. t = the firm’s marginal tax rate, so that all 
pension costs are adjusted for taxes.  
The Lagrangean is: 
                                                      __
 V     =    Φ(L,K)]    +    λ [ C  -   γK    -   {β1 + (1-t)[ β2 + β3]}L ]             (9)
            __
where   C  = represents the least upper bound on the firm’s cost budget. 
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Maximizing L with respect to K and L yields the following marginal rates of  technical 
substitution: 
 ∂V    =     ∂ Φ(L,K)]  -    λ (γ )                                                                  (10)
            ∂K            ∂K
 ∂V     =    ∂ Φ(L,K)]   -    λ {β1 + (1-t)[ β2 + β3]}                                    (11)
            ∂L            ∂L
Equations (10) and (11) imply that: 
 ∂ Φ(L,K)]                
            ∂L                             {β1 + (1-t)[ β2 + β3]}        
         ---------------       =       -------------------------                                                 (12)
 ∂ Φ(L,K)]                              γ   
            ∂K
so the marginal rates of  substitution of  capital for labor equals the ratio of  their prices in 
production.   The firm operates up to the level where the return to each factor of  production 
equals its marginal product.   Rearranging (12), multiplying means times extremes we obtain: 
 ∂ Φ(L,K)]   γ  =    ∂ Φ(L,K)]  {β1 + (1-t)[ β2 + β3]                                     (13) 
 ∂L                         ∂K                                                  
which provides insight into the substitution of  capital for labor based on their input costs.  If  
you fix labor costs and labor productivity in (13), then any increase in the cost of  capital   γ 
requires a commensurate increase in the marginal productivity of  capital, otherwise there will 
be substitution of  labor for capital.   By the same token, should the factor cost of  labor β1 + 
(1-t)[ β2 + β3]  go up, with fixed capital productivity and capital costs,  then there must be added 
gains to the marginal productivity of  labor or else capital will be substituted for the more costly 
labor input.   The application of  equation (13) relates to a firm’s choices with respect to funding 
a pension plan as deferred compensation.    If  β1, β2 or β3 rise, then the firm will require either 
increasing labor productivity, or seek to reduce pension participants, substituting capital for labor. 
Examples of  such decision making would be the layoffs in the airline and automotive industries 
in 2004 and 2005.   Alternatively, firms faced with an increase in either their actuarial funding 
cost, β2 or the cost of  PBGC premiums, β3 may seek to reduce or eliminate these expenses by 
converting the defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan and not be burdened by 
funding the costs of  future benefits or the uncertainty of  future PBGC premiums.   Pension 
plan conversions by IBM and Rockwell International in the 1990’s are examples of  such financial 
management decisions.   Note also, that higher corporate taxes would increase the value of  the 
pension fund expenses and thereby promote the usefulness of  a defined benefit plan to the firm. 
If  the firm is in a high tax bracket, the impact of  expensing pension contributions and PBGC 
premiums lessens a company’s out of  pocket pension costs.  However, lower corporate taxes 
has the opposite effect and may contribute to a company’s exit from defined benefit plans.   The 
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lowering of  corporate tax rates in the 1980’s and 1990’s may have contributed to the conversion 
of  adequately funded defined benefit pensions into defined contribution 401-K plans.  From a 
public policy standpoint, the external relationship between corporate tax rates and its influence 
on defined benefit plan expenses should be considered when considering the overall health of  
PBGC.  Conversion of  adequately funded, defined benefit pensions, into 401K plans over the 
past 10 years have eroded PBGC’s ability to collect premium income.   The better plans have 
left the PBGC insurance system, leaving a larger proportion of  inadequately funded pensions to 
pay premiums.  However, the distressed plans cannot afford the increased premiums, β3 which 
motivates them to declare bankruptcy and put the pension liability to PBGC. 
                  Appendix  C 
Net Premium Income Over Benefits Paid and 
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